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NORTH CAROLINA’S DUELING PROPERTY RIGHTS 
INTERESTS: WATER AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
RUPA RUSSE1 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the numerous North Carolina specific legal doctrinal 
and statutory regimes impacted by hydraulic fracking2 operations in the 
state. It seeks to assess the state-specific legal conflicts present between in-
dividual rights to frack shale oil, previously settled water rights, and liabil-
ity issues. Additionally, the Article provides a bedrock synopsis of present 
legal doctrine that informs resolution of property rights conflicts between 
fracking rights and water protection stakeholders. The Article first estab-
lishes the technology and history behind hydraulic fracturing in the U.S. It 
then presents an overview of common law property rights that can influence 
legal decision makers, followed by an assessment of both North Carolina 
specific and federal statutes that impact the various property stakeholders. 
  
 
        1.    Ms. Rupa Russe is a December 2018 graduate of North Carolina Central School of Law and 
served as Staff Editor of the NCCU Environmental Law Review (2018-2019). 
 2. Hydraulic fracturing is one step in a fracking mining process; this step is also known as ‘hydro-
fracking’. See https://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Terms/p/play.aspx (accessed Oct. 19, 2019). 
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INTRODUCTION 
As water flows, so does the law. Legal doctrine can be established from 
the bottom up, or the top down. From the bottom up, the resolution of specific 
local stakeholder conflicts can result in changes to settled statewide legal 
doctrines. Conversely, settled legal doctrine can restrict a case-specific solu-
tion in a local stakeholder conflict. In real property law, absent regulations 
enacted by a governmental entity, a stakeholder’s vested rights protect their 
interest in the control and relative unrestricted access to the resources located 
on, or within shallow depths, of their real property. Such vested rights in-
clude: access to water discoverable on one’s real property3; and mining rights 
under one’s real property. 
In North Carolina, two doctrines govern the vesting of rights to resources 
on real property, riparian and statutorily defined mining rights. Riparian 
rights have long governed the vesting of water rights to a real property 
owner.4 The riparian doctrine is reliant on an age-old expectation that an 
abundance of water exists in North Carolina.5 Riparian water laws vest water 
rights to a property owner once the owner has established access, and use of, 
a naturally occurring water source on their real property.6 
Mining rights became statutorily vested with North Carolina’s Mining Act 
of 1971. This Mining Rights Act vested a property owner’s rights to mine 
natural resources on their real property.7 Since this Act, mining has been con-
sidered a property right that is “a basic and essential activity making an im-
portant contribution to the economic well-being of North Carolina and the 
nation.”8 The Mining Act of 1971 also recognized the need for “the greatest 
practical degree of protection and restoration” by the mining industry9; 
 
 3. David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and 
Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 Urb. L. Ann. 63, 65 (1971). 
 4. Kimberly C. Simmons, Strong’s North Carolina Index, 4th, 29A N.C. Index 4th Waters and 
Watercourses § 24, (Westlaw, February 2019 update) (“North Carolina adheres to the ‘American Rule’ 
of water use where the landowner has the right only to a reasonable and beneficial use of the waters upon 
the land or its percolations or to some useful purpose connected with his occupation and enjoyment.” 
(N.C. Gen .Stat. §§ 143–211(a))). 
 5. Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 
445, 478 (2008). 
 6. Sandra B. Zellmer, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 679, 693 (2008) (“In the 
eastern United States, the public trust doctrine underlies the law of riparianism, where landowners adja-
cent to a natural watercourse possess usufructuary rights to water that flows through or past their land, but 
are liable for monetary damages or injunctive relief if they deplete the natural flow in a way that harms 
other users.”). 
 7. “minerals, ores, or other solid matter”, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74-49 (2019). 
 8. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 74-46,47 (2019). 
 9. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74-48 (2019). 
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however, it does not resolve the legal property rights conflicts between min-
ing pollution and the common law doctrines protecting freshwater access.10 
These two rights are squarely in conflict in North Carolina. Technological 
advancements in the hydraulic fracturing industry have created pros and cons 
regarding the conflicted vested property rights. Advancements in technology 
can create inspired solutions for more efficient resource harvesting. Yet, 
those same advancements can also create disruption to settled real property 
law by opening access to resource harvesting in ways never before envi-
sioned or available. 
The sudden introduction of technological advancements in a field can re-
sult in acute first impression legal conflicts that leave no settled remedial 
doctrine available to the decision maker. This results in an upending of pre-
viously calibrated law; an upending that has a profound impact on the very 
functionality of established legal doctrine. Dramatic developments in re-
source harvest technology exacerbate existing North Carolina legal doctrinal 
vulnerabilities. Hydraulic fracturing operations present a significant chal-
lenge to the delicate equilibrium between conflicting real property rights 
holders in the state. 
NORTH CAROLINA’S GOVERNING STRUCTURE 
Nationwide, fracking operations are causing much debate. A state’s gov-
erning structure, Home Rule or Dillon’s Rule, determines which governing 
body has regulatory power over the industry. Home Rule states allow for 
county by county determinations about the legality of fracking; while in Dil-
lon’s Rule states, the state government makes the determination statewide. 
North Carolina is governed under a structure similar to the Dillon’s Rule, 
wherein all localities in the state are empowered to make decisions as dele-
gated by the state’s General Assembly via specific statutes11. 
A Dillon’s Rule-esque approach to governance cements a top-down struc-
ture for addressing legal conflicts in a state. Local municipalities in such a 
state, serve as enforcers of the legislative body’s statewide goals and poli-
cies.12 A legislative body’s inclination to regulate a natural resource-based 
industry indicates how the body views the natural resources and the rights of 
a state’s population to access and harness those resources. Directives, or lack 
 
 10. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 74-50, 54, 55, 56 (2019). 
 11. The Dillon’s Rule is a “broad delegation of authority” by the State’s legislative body; however, 
in North Carolina, the General Assembly authorizes local authority on a statute by statute basis. 
https://canons.sog.unc.edu/is-north-carolina-a-dillons-rule-state/, (last accessed October 14, 2019). 
 12. “It is the policy of the General Assembly that the counties and cities of this State should have 
adequate authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties, functions, privileges, and immunities conferred 
upon them by law”, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4. 
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thereof, in a trickle-down governance state, such as North Carolina, carry 
extensive implications for how localities and real property owners handle 
their individual legal responsibilities in the harvesting and safeguarding of 
natural resources. 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
Fracturing has been used for the extraction of oil and gas from shale de-
posits since 1949.13 Since that time, fracturing had been constrained to verti-
cal mining shafts, limiting the industry’s ability to access difficult to reach 
plays of oil and natural gas.14 In recent years, advancements in mining tech-
nology have allowed for a new form of mining, horizontal fracturing. Hori-
zontal fracturing technology allows the oil industry to drill horizontal mines 
deep into the subsurface of the earth.15 Horizontal fracking is particularly 
useful when harvesting oil and natural gas that is trapped in smaller micro-
fractures between compacted layers of shale.16 Hydraulic fracturing involves 
the injection of a liquid mixture that usually contains proprietary combina-
tions of chemicals, water, and sand that assist in the efficient extraction of oil 
from the deposits.17 In horizontal hydraulic fracturing, a liquid mixture is in-
jected into the drilled shafts at an angle and under high pressure.18 Pressur-
ized injection of the fluid mixture causes fractures which are then propped 
open by the fluid mixture sand. This creates pathways that allow the trapped 
oil or natural gas to be accessed for extraction.19 
Hydraulic fracturing creates two primary safety concerns and a judicial 
concern. The first is due to the geology of earth being a series of compacted 
 
 13. https://aoghs.org/technology/hydraulic-fracturing/, (last accessed Oct. 15, 2019). 
 14. See Schlumberger, Oilfield Glossary, https://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Terms/p/play.aspx 
( accessed September 14, 2018) (“An area in which hydrocarbon accumulations or prospects of a given 
type occur.”). 
 15. The terms “fracking” and “hydraulic fracturing” denote the gas extraction process known more 
technically as high volume “slickwater” horizontal hydraulic fracturing. The process involves drilling a 
vertical well thousands of feet into the ground until reaching natural gas–rich shale rock, at which point 
the well is drilled horizontally to stay within the shale rock formation (a horizontal layer). For a more 
comprehensive background on the process, see generally George E. King, Hydraulic Fracturing 101: 
What Every Representative, Environmentalist, Regulator, Reporter, Investor, University Researcher, 
Neighbor and Engineer Should Know About Estimating Frac Risk and Improving Frac Performance in 
Unconventional Gas and Oil Wells, George E. King, (This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE 
Hydraulic Fracturing Technology Conference held in The Woodlands, Texas, USA, 6–8 February 2012); 
Soc’y of Petrol. Eng’rs, Hydraulic Fracturing 101 (2012); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
GAO-12-732, Oil and Gas: Information On Shale Resources, Development, and Environmental and Pub-
lic Health Risks 6–13 (2012). 
 16. Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydraulically Fracturing A Natural Gas Well, 
32 Utah Env’t. L. Rev. 67, 75 (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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layers with occasional stabilized pockets of air, gas or liquid. The intentional 
disruption of those layers can result in destabilization of subsequent layers 
that can cause earthquakes underground or sinkholes on the surface of the 
earth.20 The second concern is, in order to withdraw the full potential of a 
shale oil reserve from a play, chemicals are introduced in order to better assist 
in the efficient extraction of the resource.21 This second challenge creates a 
reasonable concern that groundwater could be contaminated by the chemicals 
used in the fluid mixture injected into the shale deposits, due to the mixture’s 
travelling via the uncontrolled cracks into layers where aquifers lie.22 This 
pollution could occur at either a mine injection site or, via cracks along the 
mining shaft casing.23 Both these safety concerns raise questions about po-
tential harms to real property owners.24 
The judicial concern is the disruption of previously settled legal doctrines, 
such as notice requirements, by horizontal fracking operations. Horizontal 
fracking gives mining companies freedoms that do not comport with the tra-
ditional metes and bounds of property law.25 The industry’s use of horizontal 
drilling technology miles below Earth’s surface raises legal questions about 
notice. The potential of the technology reaching real property not adjacent to 
the injection or extraction site, without providing visual surface-impact no-
tice to property owners is significant. This presents legal questions including 
who has the right to subterranean reserves; who is liable for immediate or 
delayed injuries resulting from hydraulic fracking; and what are the standards 
for remedying injured parties?26 
 
 20. See John Brodylo, et al., The Stability of Fault Systems in the South Shore of the St. Lawrence 
Lowlands of Quebec: Implications for Shale Gas Development, Can. Unconventional Resources 
Conf.(2011). 
 21. Roberson, supra note 15 at 75-76. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. These harms could include: liability by landlords, of property with well water, to renters for 
unsafe living conditions; damages to property due to earthquakes; and personal injuries from contaminated 
well water or injuries sustained in an earthquake or sinkhole. 
 25. Nicholas S. Cortese, Drawing Lines in the Shale: Local Zoning Bans, the Takings Clause, and 
the Clash to Come If New York State Promulgates Hydrofracking Regulations, 64 Syracuse L. Rev. 489, 
500 (2014); (Additionally, the industry’s direct impact on contract law and the development of regulatory 
standards necessitate a review of the legal feilds balancing of interests standards), see Rural Advancement 
Foundation International-USA, Issue Area: Landowner Rights & Fracking, 
https://rafiusa.org/issues/landowner-rights-and-fracking/ (explanation of “forced pooling”); Local News, 
Fracking: Many inN.C.don’t control rights to gas under their land, https://www.wral.com/fracking-many-
in-nc-don-t-control-rights-to-gas-under-their-land/13660362/ (“split estates”), (accessed September 15, 
2018). Metes and bounds are defined as, “the boundaries or limits of a tract of land especially as described 
by reference to lines and distances between points on the land”, https://www.merriam-webster.com/le-
gal/metes%20and%20bounds (accessed October 14, 2019). 
 26. “The chemicals used in fracking fluid can be quite hazardous, including boric acid, sodium chlo-
ride and acetic acid.” Initiafy,https://www.initiafy.com/blog/fracking-in-oil-and-gas-industry/, (accessed 
September 14, 2018). 
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This article evaluates the laws applicable in North Carolina that are deter-
minative of the aforementioned questions. Part I assesses the history of frack-
ing, industry interest in North Carolina, environmental concerns, and techno-
logical advancements. Part II assesses established rights and common law 
property conflicts with legal doctrine. Part III assesses the state statutory and 
federal constitutional protections. Part IV addresses fracking operation influ-
ence on property insurance and business liability. 
I. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN NORTH CAROLINA 
A. History and Technology: Fracking 
Industry interest in hydraulic fracturing mining for oil and natural gas is a 
recent development in North Carolina. The state has no history of large-scale 
oil and gas mining, and the “legislative framework for regulating drilling 
was, until recently, based on laws passed in the 1940s.”27 A rapidly emerging 
industry can create an unstable market and undermine settled regulatory 
schemes. Rapidly emerging industries often result in quickly formed policies 
that have the unintended effect of upsetting the equilibrium of settled legal 
doctrines. “The rapid expansion in the scope, intensity and geographic range 
of shale gas development in recent years dictates that…[m]any states regulate 
shale gas development primarily or exclusively with regulations written be-
fore unconventional drilling became common.”28 
When a new technology is introduced into the market and no assessment 
of existing legal doctrines occurs, one of two things can happen. First, exist-
ing legal doctrine can create an inhospitable environment for new technol-
ogy, stamping out innovation. Conversely, the second possibility is that new 
technology can stampede settled legal rights, thus resulting in property con-
flicts that not only have economic impact, but also pose safety concerns. In 
North Carolina, neither the legislature, nor the judicial system have addressed 
the conflicting property interests between hydraulic fracturing operations and 
riparian rights to groundwater. 
There are conflicting government assessments of the viability of an oil and 
gas industry in North Carolina. In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey, an 
agency of the Department of the Interior, released a report that, for the first 
time, revealed the presence of hydrocarbon source rocks in two basins 
 
 27. Adrian Down, et al., Shale Gas Extraction in North Carolina: Research Recommendations and 
Public Health Implications. 121 Env’t. Health Perspect. A292, A293 (2013), 
https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/pdf/10.1289/ehp.1307402. 
 28. Nathan Richardson et al., “The State of State Shale Gas Regulation.” Resources For The Future, 
(2013), http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/docs/GEN195-RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf, (accessed 
September 14, 2018). 
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located in North Carolina.29 Subsequent reports indicated that the total quan-
tity of natural gas present in the North Carolina plays would meet approxi-
mately a total of five years of the state’s domestic natural gas consumption 
needs.30 However, the United States Energy Information Agency, an agency 
of the United States Department of Energy, reports that North Carolina has 
no natural gas wells that are producing, and there are no proven underground 
reserves that “are sufficient for production.”31 
B. Geological and Environmental Influences 
North Carolina’s western Piedmont and Blue Ridge geological substrata 
are composed of “thick sequences of regolith (surficial aquifer) above [a] 
fractured bedrock” aquifer.32 These aquifers have solution cavities that can 
“act as channels for the transmission of sewage, surface contaminants, or 
other types of pollution.”33 The surficial aquifer is the most used aquifer in 
the state for serving individual wells, “[t]he surficial aquifer is the shallowest 
and most susceptible to contamination from septic tank systems and other 
pollution sources.”34 The wells that draw from these aquifers are miles apart 
from each other.35 The State’s geological substrata allows any type of leaking 
mine shaft, injection site, or disposal well to potentially run through path-
ways into cavities that house potable groundwater.36 Because water is a nat-
urally precious resource that is pivotal to sustaining life, it is difficult to cal-
culate damages for a contamination injury such as this.37 
 
 29. J. C. Reid & R. C. Milic, Hydrocarbon Source Rocks in the Deep River and Dan River Triassic 
Basins, North Carolina: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2008-1108 (2008). The United States 
Geological Survey is a scientific agency of the United States government. https://www.usgs.gov/ , (ac-
cessed October 16, 2019). 
 30. See Marti Maguire, North Carolina Signs Law Paving Way for Fracking, https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-usa-northcarolina-fracking-idUSKBN0EF1VC20140604 (83 million barrels esti-
mated) (accessed September 14, 2018). 
 31. See https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=NC, (accessed September 14, 2018). 
 32. See http://geodata.lib.ncsu.edu/stategov/gws/2010/Aquifer%20Characteristics.htm (accessed 
Oct. 19, 2019). 
(“In the Piedmont and Blue Ridge Provinces of North Carolina, two major aquifer systems exist, and 
usually interact with one another. The surficial materials or regolith of these provinces forms the uncon-
fined aquifer and the fractured rock beneath, is the unconfined to semi-confined bedrock aquifer. Usually 
the surficial aquifer feeds the fractures in the bedrock aquifer.”) 
 33. Supra note 43. 
 34. Supra note 44. 
 35. Supra note 45 (“In large portions of these aquifers, sands and limestone materials are so well 
connected that withdrawals cause pressure reductions many miles from the pumping center [ . . . T]he 
negative outcome is that pumping at one well affects water levels in wells for miles around.”). 
 36. Supra note 46 (“The surficial aquifer is the shallowest and most susceptible to contamination 
from septic tank systems and other pollution sources.”). 
 37. Kjellstrom, T., Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries. Oxford U. Press (Jamison 
DT, et al., eds., 2 ed. 2006) (“Direct contamination can also occur from badly designed hazardous waste 
sites or from industrial sites.”). 
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The potential interconnectivity of the well-supplying cavities makes 
preemptive identification of the cause of damage impracticable, until after 
the damage is done. Establishing a correlation between injury and causation 
in a groundwater contamination claim becomes exceedingly difficult as a 
plaintiff must “offer more than evidence of the contamination of their water 
and a release of contaminants in the area.”38 To succeed, the Plaintiff must 
be able to show a causal relationship between a defendant’s pollution and the 
contaminants found in the plaintiff’s water supply.39 Unless a plausible con-
nection is made, liability cannot be established.40 
C. Groundwater Contamination Concerns 
There is considerable concern that failing to require disclosure of the 
chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing operations would increase the likeli-
hood of damages suffered by unaware stakeholders.41 The potential impacted 
stakeholders are those whose water rights give them reasonable use, via 
wells or springs that are present on their real property.42 Should water become 
contaminated by chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing operations, the lack 
of notice creates a damages problem that, depending on the chemicals used, 
poses a threat to both life and property interests. 
The State, as arbiter of the public trust, has the duty to prevent damage to 
resources of value to the general public. The right to clean water would be 
permanently impacted by chemical contamination of the water aquifers lo-
cated in the subterranean layers of the state. Unlike a property owner who is 
stuck using the slow-churning judicial system to prove that a threat warrants 
interference with another private landowner’s rights, the state can use its right 
to eminent domain to gain immediate control of a polluting operations. How-
ever, regulatory guidance would best resolve the potential for conflict. The 
State’s regulations can assist in preventing injury, or it could prevent the State 
from having to use eminent domain powers in order to provide remedy to the 
general public. 
 
 38. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Produc-
tion, 161 U. Pᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 431, 446 (2013) (“[A] fracking operation may nevertheless cause groundwater 
contamination in any of three ways. First, if the natural gas well is poorly constructed, methane or frac-
turing fluids might leak from the well while passing through groundwater tables at shallow depths. Sec-
ond, if fracking fluid constituents are improperly handled on the surface, they may be spilled and seep 
into groundwater tables. Third, the disposal of wastewater or other wastes on site, if permitted by law or 
the lease, can result in groundwater contamination if and when lagoons or other disposal facilities leak.”) 
https://www.pennlawreview.com/print/Spence-161-U-Pa-L-Rev-431.pdf.. 
 39. Ellington v. Hester, 127 N.C. App. 172, 177, 487 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1997). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Infra note 47. 
 42. Supra note 45. 
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D. Industry Interest 
Despite the projected limited reserves, the 2008 U.S.Geological Survey 
report initiated a strong push from investor/speculator entities in the oil and 
gas industry to pursue fracking of these reserves in North Carolina.43 Prop-
erty owners with direct access to the plays identified in the 2008 U.S. Geo-
logical Survey report joined intrastate oil industry entities to lobby the N.C. 
General Assembly in order to pass legislation that would remove barriers to 
hydraulic fracturing operations in North Carolina.44 Starting in 2012, North 
Carolina enacted multiple laws in support of hydraulic fracturing in the state. 
The Clean Energy and Economic Security Act authorized hydraulic fractur-
ing in North Carolina45; statutes were passed that lifted the state’s46 previous 
ban on horizontal fracturing47; and legislation was enacted to prevent the dis-
closure of the chemicals used in the hydraulic fracturing process.48 The sum 
of these laws enabled a new technologically advanced mining practice in the 
state but failed to address the conflicts the new technology creates with pre-
existing legal doctrine, specifically those protecting groundwater rights. 
The long-term impact of hydraulic fracturing by the oil and gas industry in 
North Carolina requires the state’s legislature and judiciary to assess and bal-
ance the stakeholder interests and determine risk-benefit of allowing such 
operations.49 Upending settled legal doctrines that protect the rights of own-
ers to critical groundwater supplies for an industry that has the potential of 
only providing short term financial benefit to a small number of entities must 
not be done lightly.50 Interested stakeholders, such as real property owners, 
have legitimate concerns regarding the development of a high-pollution-risk 
industry within the state51. Thus, protecting the state’s clean groundwater 
 
 43. Lori Riverstone-Newell; The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Inno-
vation, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 47, Issue 3, 1 July 2017, Pages 403–425, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjx037. 
 44. See Jesse Coleman, Fracking Rules in North Carolina (Sept. 14, 2018) https://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/jesse-coleman/fracking-rules-in-north-c_b_5352907.html. 
 45. N.C. § SB-820. 
 46. Stanford D. Baird, James L. Joyce, Amy H. Fullbright, North Carolina Legalizes Horizontal 
Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, July 13, 2012 blog (accessed September 14, 2018), , 
http://www.klgates.com/north-carolina-legalizes-horizontal-drilling-and-hydraulic-fracturing-07-13-
2012/. 
 47. Clean Energy and Economic Security Act, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-393. 
 48. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-393; The term “industry” is used broadly in this Article including oil and 
gas companies, mineral rights owners, industry associations or trade groups, and other proponents for 
fracking with limited regulations. 
 49. The term “industry” is used broadly in this Article to include oil and gas companies, mineral 
rights owners, industry associations or trade groups, and other proponents for fracturing operations with 
limited regulations. 
 50. Supra note 26. 
 51. Clean water supplies are at a higher risk of contamination in areas where hydraulic fracturing 
operations occur due to the high potential of mine shaft failure that would allow the ‘trade secret’ protected 
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supply is more important than the short term financial advancement of a few 
individual oil and gas entities. 
The recent indictments of fracking industry speculators heighten the con-
cern over its rapidly developing industry. Speculators’ tactics and behaviors 
in support of the industry in other states have led to some facing felony 
charges based on substantive claims that the speculators “inflated production 
estimates, oversold investments in wells,” presented themselves as experts 
yet “had no background in the industry” in order to divert investment funds 
for personal use, or in at least one recent case, were charged with working to 
suppress fair market practices in the oil industry.52 Though any large industry 
is apt to possess individuals willing to take advantage of an industry’s weak-
nesses, the speed with which North Carolina’s hydraulic fracturing industry 
has developed has not afforded the state an ability to keep regulatory pace 
with the industry’s varied stakeholders, thereby creating an environment 
where property rights and liability issues are put in unnecessary legal con-
flict. 
Cogent efforts to cement legal doctrines in the state are frequently dis-
turbed by the politicization of the process.53 Politicization of issues also re-
sults in a lack of comprehensive regulations, leaving the judiciary to piece-
meal and adapt settled common law legal doctrines to provide remedy. This 
defacto problem-solving by the judiciary can lead to the misuse of an unreg-
ulated market. Worse, it encourages speculation in a market, the result of 
which could be damages owed by judgment-proof defendants that leave only 
the state to provide remedy in the form of medicaid healthcare to cover inju-
ries to the person and superfund clean-up costs for harms caused to the public 
 
chemical mixtures used in hydraulic fracturing to escape into a water aquifer, due to the nature of how 
shale geology is structured. 
 52. Jeff Mosier, ‘Frack Master,’ now infamous oil industry darling from Dallas, arrested in $80 
million fraud case, The Dallas Morning News, https://www.dallasnews.com/business/en-
ergy/2018/06/20/frack-masterwho-posed-oil-industry-expert-arrested-sec-called-80-million-scam (last 
updated June 21, 2018). See also, Former CEO Indicted for Masterminding Conspiracy Not to Compete 
for Oil and Natural Gas Leases, Dᴇᴘᴛ. ᴏꜰ Jᴜꜱᴛɪᴄᴇ (March 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/for-
mer-ceo-indicted-masterminding-conspiracy-not-compete-oil-and-natural-gas-leases (“Aubrey K. 
McClendon has been charged by a federal grand jury with conspiring to rig bids for the purchase of oil 
and natural gas leases in northwest Oklahoma” in violation of The Sherman Act). 
 53. The process of resolving the doctrinal conflicts legislatively is stymied by a legislative branch 
that is uninterested in working with the state’s executive branch, thereby setting up a power standoff that 
leads to no resolution on behalf of likely conflicted property interests. See Ferrel Guillory, The latest 
attempts by the legislature to strip power from the governor aren’t the only ones inN.C.history, Tʜᴇ Nᴇᴡs 
& Oʙsᴇʀᴠᴇʀ (Aug. 25, 2018, 09:00 AM) https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/arti-
cle217278790.html; see also Richard Fausset & Jonathan Martin, Battle Lines Turn North Carolina’s 
Moderation Into a Distant Memory, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/us/north-carolinas-
republican-legislature-governor.html (last updated Dec. 23, 2016). 
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interest.54 These risks are best addressed preemptively through comprehen-
sive state legislative regulations of the industry. 
II. IMPACTED RIGHTS AND CLAIMS 
A. Established Rights 
In North Carolina, one’s right to property is protected by deed or posses-
sion. The state’s common law doctrines assume the owner of real property 
has the right “to possess and use it to the exclusion of others.”55 The N.C. 
General Assembly codified an equitable owner’s rights in the title of real 
property to: transfer all or part of the property, transfer some rights, and re-
strict or modify use of said real property.56 The Torrens system is one of two 
ways real property rights are established in the state. Under the Torrens sys-
tem, to gain legal recognition of an ownership interest, the owner must reg-
ister the deed to the real property at a state county courthouse.57 These same 
registration requirements apply to mineral ownership rights in the state.58 
Required registration of deeds to real property, or minerals, at a courthouse 
is beneficial in a state where technological advancements allow for a harvest-
ing of subterranean resources without notice to the surface property owner.59 
North Carolina’s Torrens system provides an added level of security for real 
property owners who may come into conflict with parties from such a tech-
nologically advanced and unrestricted industry as the hydraulic fracturing in-
dustry. This security exists, for registered property owners, because any con-
cern of who has a priority interest in a property conflict is more readily re-
solved by the record on file at the courthouse, thus remedying the legal issues 
of notice. 
 
 54. See David Gutman, See the Freedom Industries’ chemical spill into the Elk River, Charleston, 
West Virginia (2014). Freedom Industries bankruptcy case officially settled, Charleston Gazette-Mail, 
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/freedom-industries-bankruptcy-case-officially-settled/arti-
cle_99bc86c9-8b79-5451-9f5d-49320aee7359.html, (last updated Oct. 7, 2015). 
 55. Real property is defined as a “term that is applied to land and immovable property on land such 
as buildings.” Real Property, Black’s Law Dictionary, (2nd Ed.,1995). 
 56. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-6.4; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2. 
 57. “The Torrens system, in general, is a method of creating a certificate of title and then registering 
a legal and basically absolute title to real property.” Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and 
Adverse Possession Reform Act, A Proposal for Reform of the United States Real Property Law, 12 Buff. 
Envt’l. L.J. 1, 19-20 (2004). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 43-14; “For over a century, North Carolina property owners 
have been offered an alternative to the traditional deed and recording system. Title to land may instead be 
entered in the Torrens system of registered titles.”John V. Orth, Torrens Title in North Carolina - Maybe 
a Hundred Years Is Long Enough, 39 Campbell L. Rev. 271 (2017). 
 58. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46-4. 
 59. “A holder of the mineral rights located under real property can petition a state court to partition 
the mineral rights without involving the surface owner.”, https://www.sosnc.gov/docu-
ments/forms/land_records/training/Land_Records_Mineral_Rights_2014.pdf (accessed Oct. 14, 2019). 
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B. North Carolina Water Rights 
North Carolina’s water rights laws are based on the premise that ground-
water must be captured in order to have possession, a premise that does not 
acknowledge basic hydrogeology.60 
[T]he old cases on groundwater try to distinguish between “underground 
streams” versus more slowly “percolating” groundwater . . . Judges made 
this distinction thinking that the rules for surface water ownership could be 
transferred to “underground streams” and thus avoid the legally perplexing 
problem of water slowly sloshing around beneath us in unpredictable ways. 
In reality, it was and is difficult or impossible to prove the existence of an 
underground stream.61 
North Carolina’s geological makeup varies based on the region. The geology 
is as an old ocean floor with unconsolidated sediment that results in ground-
water existing under the surface in “a series of aquifers that lie somewhat like 
a tilted layer cake, one on top of another[,]” each interconnected.62 
The state’s geological aquifer structure makes isolation of property rights 
along real property boundaries difficult to ascertain as “groundwater moves 
through preferential pathways in rock.”63 Because groundwater has been eas-
ily accessible and of ample supply in North Carolina, the doctrine of reason-
able use has governed the rights to groundwater access in the State.64 The 
reasonable use doctrine establishes that a property owner making non-dis-
tributary use of pumped groundwater for an economically beneficial use can 
use as much water as needed, without concern for other landowners’ needs, 
as long as the property owner does not engage in waste.65 
Due to the geological makeup of North Carolina aquifers, a property owner 
may have rights to one of ten confined pools of water, which are separated 
by sand, clay or limestone.66 An undelineated pool of water, with multiple 
 
 60. See Richard Whisnant , Who Owns the Water, Part I Groundwater, The Envtl. Fin. Blog (Apr. 
29, 2015), http://efc.web.unc.edu/2015/04/29/who-owns-groundwater/. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Valuing Ground Water: Economic Concepts and Approaches, National Research Council, Na-
tional Academy Press, 106 (1997). 
 66. “The hydrogeologic framework of the North Carolina Coastal Plain aquifer system consists of 
ten aquifers separated by nine confining units. From top to bottom the aquifers are: the surficial aquifer, 
Yorktown aquifer, Pungo River aquifer, Castle Hayne aquifer, Beaufort aquifer, Peedee aquifer, Black 
Creek aquifer, upper Cape Fear aquifer, lower Cape Fear aquifer, and the Lower Cretaceous aquifer. The 
uppermost aquifer (the surficial aquifer in most places) is a water-table aquifer and the bottom of the 
system is underlain by crystalline bedrock. The sedimentary deposits forming the aquifers are of Holocene 
to Cretaceous age and are composed mostly of sand with lesser amounts of gravel and limestone. Confin-
ing units between aquifers are composed primarily of clay and silt. The thickness of the aquifers ranges 
from zero along the Fall Line to more than 10,000 feet at Cape Hatteras.” Winner Jr., M.D. and Coble, 
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rights holders, makes contravening influences, like toxic pollution, more 
challenging to remedy because identification of the responsible tortfeasor is 
difficult if multiple sources could be the cause of the damage or injury. Ina-
bility to identify a responsible polluting party sets up a legal environment 
where any contravening interest to water rights has the likelihood of benefit-
ting from damnum absque injuria. A defacto legal protection results because 
identification of the interested parties to the pool of water is unascertaina-
ble.67 
At first, it may be enticing to the legal community to leave this conflict as 
an unavoidable legal quandary because there is no animus possidendi.68 
However, failure to resolve the conflicts between ownership, responsibility, 
and liability ultimately result in a default policy that burdens state taxpayers. 
Thus, it is the taxpayers who bear the negative impacts from the mismanage-
ment of operations that cause pollution of water. This is specifically true in 
industries whose operations risk having chemicals seep into aquifers that pro-
vide drinking water for millions of people. 
C. Common Law Property Rights Conflicts 
1. Adverse Possession 
The potential for an adverse possession claim exists regarding mineral 
rights. Specifically between fracking operations and groundwater access 
rights.69 Although no claims of adverse possession of property, real or min-
eral, have occurred since the North Carolina Mining Act of 1971 was en-
acted70, the potential for such a claim does exist. Once a mineral right is sev-
ered from the land, it is permanent.71 Once severance occurs, the mineral 
rights can be harvested, freely traded, and possessed by either the owner of 
the right or by any interloper who has the capacity to harvest the mineral.72 
Severed mineral rights can be adversely possessed once harvested. In Hoil-
man v. Johnson, the North Carolina Supreme Court established the common 
 
R.W., Hydrogeologic framework of the North Carolina Coastal Plain aquifer system, Open-File Report 
87-690, U.S. Geological Survey (1989). 
 67. Damnum absque injuria translates to “loss or damage without injury.” 
 68. “An intention to possess”; Marjorie L. Benson, et al., Understanding Property: A Guide, Thom-
son Carswell (2008) (2nd ed.) (“In order to claim possessory rights, an individual must establish physical 
control of the res [/property] and the intention to possess.”) 
 69. Adverse possession is the statutory method of acquiring title to land under certain conditions. 
Black’s Law Dictionary, (2nd Ed.,1995). 
 70. It established a required permitting process for any mining of minerals in the state. 
 71. W. E. Shipley, Grant, reservation, or exception as creating separate and independent legal es-
tate in solid minerals or as passing only incorporeal privilege or license, 66 A.L.R.2d 978 (1959) (“grant 
only a right to take ore, not a corporeal interest.”). 
 72. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46 - 4. 
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law approach to adverse possession of mineral rights when it held a mineral 
right’s holder “must be disseised73 to lose his right, and there can be no dis-
seisin by any act which does not actually take the minerals out of his posses-
sion.”74 Once an adverse possessor takes control or possession, for the nec-
essary duration of time, permanent ownership of the mineral transfers to the 
adverse possessor.75 
The State’s statutory permitting system protects owners from the potential 
of adverse possession under various statutory requirements of notice to adja-
cent landowners; and state pre-approval of a permit by a regulatory commis-
sion. However, the inherent conflict persists under common law as the open 
and notorious possession elements are difficult to assess in mines that run 
horizontally without regard for the metes and bounds of established property 
boundaries. Of specific concern are mines, whose advanced technology al-
low for the extraction of shale oil or natural gas reserves that could be located 
miles from the mine injection point. 
The Fourth Circuit held that defined boundaries are not necessary in order 
to establish adverse possession of property.76 In Duke Power Co. v. Toms the 
Court, relying on testimony alone, held that an adverse possession of mineral 
rights was established even though some of the boundaries could not be lo-
cated.77 The Duke ruling, that predates North Carolina’s Mining Act of 1971, 
established under common law, that natural resources could be taken without 
verified proof of the location of where the ownership existed. This ruling 
challenges the state’s regulatory presumption that surface metes and bound 
demarcations are sufficient to define notice requirements. 
Adverse possession of mineral rights poses a significant risk to stakehold-
ers of water rights. The capacity of horizontal hydraulic fracturing to access 
neighboring oil or shale reserves implicates the potential, pursuant to Duke, 
of the adverse possession of shale deposits of oil and natural gas plays that 
exist outside the metes and bounds of defined property laws.78 During the 
adverse possession accrual period, secondary stakeholders, such as those re-
liant on wells for groundwater, can be impacted without due notice. 
Lack of proximity of a groundwater stakeholder’s well to the mining in-
jection or shaft site may prohibit notice. A real property owner may have 
open and notorious notice of an adverse possession of their mineral rights 
 
 73. Disseised is defined as “to be disposed of.” 
 74. Hoilman v. Johnson, 80 S.E. 249, 250 (1913) (“The presumption that the party having possession 
of the surface has the possession of the subsoil containing minerals does not exist when surface rights and 
mineral rights are severed.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Duke Power Co. v. Toms, 118 F.2d 443, 445 (4th Cir. 1941). 
 77. Id.. 
 78. Infra note 13. 
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(geological activity impacting their real property). However, under state stat-
ute, water rights stakeholders who are secondarily impacted by the adverse 
possession of oil deposits through hydraulic fracturing on another person’s 
property, would not have open and notorious notice of the subsurface har-
vesting. Additionally, without proximity to the mine injection site the water 
rights’ stakeholder would not be due notice under the State statutes of such 
activity taking place in proximity to their well. 
2. Tort Doctrines 
Tort law in North Carolina is available to protect any individual harmed 
through negligence, intentional misconduct, or conduct that carries strict lia-
bility. Undertaking a duty creates an obligation by that party to use due care. 
Furthermore, a duty to act arises when: (1) a wrongdoer causes harm with an 
instrumentality that was under her control; or (2) if it was foreseeable that 
the act would cause harm to the specific plaintiff, and the wrongdoer had the 
opportunity and ability to exercise care to prevent the harm.79 The critical 
elements of a common law tort claim for one’s failure to act when they had 
a duty to, are: (1) the nature and underlying risk of the harm; and (2) an in-
tentional disregard of the risk of harm. The North Carolina statute of limita-
tions for personal property damages is three years.80 In addition, North Car-
olina’s statute of repose is ten years81, following the wrong-doer’s last culpa-
ble act. As a result of these statutory time constraints claims may be barred 
as tort injury claims resulting from toxic poisoning from a tainted water 
source can take years to become known.82 
A dangerous condition in an industrial activity can give rise to a common 
law tort claim because the tortfeasor is on notice of the potential risk of the 
activity. Taking action that has a known high likelihood of dangerous results 
shows an intent to disregard the risk. Should an owner maintain an artificial 
condition with high risk, the owner must exercise reasonable care and give 
notice to those outside the premises who would be affected by the artificial 
condition.83 North Carolina is a jurisdiction that has adopted contributory 
 
 79. See L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 336 (1942) (The duty is not the point where the 
child was negligent; the duty arises at a reasonable point when they could have stopped the escalator). 
 80. Statute of limitations is the “[t]ime frame set by legislation where affected parties need to take 
action to enforce rights or seek redress after injury or damage.” Black’s Law Dictionary, (2nd Ed.,1995); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15. 
 81. Statute of repose is, the number of years after the event the party has to act, Black’s Law Dic-
tionary, (2nd Ed.,1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-15. 
 82. See Catherine Watson Kozoil, Massachusetts Practice Series TM, § 9.28. Particular injuries and 
diseases—Lead poisoning and other toxic injuries, (Westlaw, 3d ed., November 2018 Update). 
 83. See Stephane A. Giggetts, et al, Strong’s North Carolina Index, 22 N.C. Index 4th Negligence § 
67 (Westlaw, February 2019 Update). 
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negligence as an affirmative defense to negligence claims.84 As such, an in-
jured party who failed to take action to prevent their own injury is barred 
from seeking a tort remedy. 
i. Nuisance 
Under North Carolina’s common law, a property owner can bring a claim 
of nuisance if their right to use and enjoy their real property is negatively 
impacted by the primary or secondary effects of hydraulic fracturing. Nui-
sance is “that which annoys and disturbs one in the possession of her prop-
erty, rendering its ordinary use or occupation physically uncomfortable to 
her”.85 Moreover, nuisance is a common law tort that protects a landowner’s 
right to the quiet use and enjoyment of her property from interference by a 
wrongdoer.86 Physical invasion of another’s property is not necessary in or-
der to establish a nuisance claim.87 
Nuisance claims are classified as either public or private.88 A public nui-
sance is one that affects a large group of members of the public, it is not 
specific to land.89 Public nuisance is not actually a tort, as it lacks a required 
element of a tort claim, particularized injury; the harm is spread generally.90 
Thus, a government agency instead usually brings a public nuisance claim as 
a public action.91 
While a public nuisance involves an injury to a community, a private nui-
sance involves a particular injury to a specific individual. In a private nui-
sance claim, the affected individual can bring suit directly against the wrong-
doer. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the quiet enjoyment of 
her property was significantly diminished in order to recover monetary dam-
ages and/or injunctive relief.92 Private nuisance claims may be brought under 
a theory of strict liability, intentional tort, or negligence.93  
   
 
 84. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-139; 15A N.C. Admin. Code 5H.1802(b) supercedes the state’s Last Clear 
Chance doctrine. 
 85. Alan D. Woodlief, Jr., North Carolina Law of Damages, Definitions, N.C. Damages § 31:1 
(Westlaw, 5th ed. December 2018 Update). 
 86. Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 265 N.C. 373, 144 S.E.2d 121 (1965). 
 87. Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co., 91 F. Supp. 2d 881, 883 (M.D.N.C. 1999). 
 88. 22 N.C. Index 4th Nuisances Summary (2019). 
 89. Id. 
 90. “Public nuisance is properly regarded as a public action rather than a tort, as revealed by a num-
ber of its features, including the nature of the interest protected – rights common to the general public – 
and the traditional understanding that public nuisance is a crime.” Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance 
a Tort?, 4(2) J. Tort L. ii (2011). 
 91. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-308 (In addition to a civil suit, the government may seek criminal 
charges against a wrongdoer for public nuisance.). 
 92. N.C. ST. § 1-539. 
 93. Id. 
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ii. Nuisance per Accidens 
The Hydraulic fracturing industry in North Carolina is susceptible to a nui-
sance per accidens tort claim, as any industry would be. A per accidens claim 
arises when “by reason of [the nuisance’s] location, or by reason of the man-
ner in which [the nuisance is] constructed, maintained, or operated,” the ac-
tivity or building becomes a nuisance.94 In Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina held that in order to establish a prima facie 
case of nuisance per accidens, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the wrongdoer’s 
use of her property, under the circumstances, unreasonably invaded or inter-
fered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property; and 
(2) because of the unreasonable invasion or interference, the plaintiff suffered 
substantial injury.95 A per accidens claim can arise when an activity is in-
tended to function without creating a nuisance, but results in a nuisance.96 
iii. Nuisance Remedy 
The available remedy for an identified private nuisance depends on the 
circumstances of each case, and are heavily fact determinate. One remedy is 
an injunction, also known as an abatement. An injunction is appropriate 
when the condition is one that can be avoided.97 When the challenged condi-
tion cannot be abated, monetary damages are available to a plaintiff. Any 
monetary damages awarded to a plaintiff are based on the loss in property 
value caused by the permanent nature of the nuisance. A court may choose 
to impose both remedies to a matter.98 In deciding whether to enjoin a nui-
sance or to award monetary damages, the court often balances hardships and 
benefits in its decision. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has distin-
guished between two balancing tests, the unreasonable interference test and 
remedy. With the unreasonable interference test the court looks at the unrea-
sonableness of the defendant’s action to determine the resolution.99 In the 
remedy test used in the context of nuisance, the court looks at the conse-
quences of the defendant’s actions to determine the resolution.100 These two 
tests give courts maximum flexibility in considering the best remedial reso-
lution to a conflict. 
 
 94. Elliott v. Muehlbach, 620 S.E.2d 266, 269 (2005). 
 95. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1962). 
 96. “[L]awful business is not normally nuisance per se, but may become nuisance per accidens 
because of its operation or other factors.” Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
 97. 6A N.C. Index 4th Courts § 88 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 200, 334 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1985). 
 100. Id. 
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iv. Strict Liability and Permits 
An industry can be strictly liable if it is engaged in activities with a known 
high risk, such as ones with the foreseeable potential of polluting. Strict lia-
bility applies liability to a wrongdoer if the activity of the wrongdoer or the 
condition of the property are abnormally dangerous. However, a permitted 
activity, such as hydraulic fracturing, is less likely to be found strictly liable. 
The “only way that a permit-authorized activity can be enjoined under a nui-
sance theory is if it is operated negligently.”101 
A permit exists to authorize an activity. But permitted activities can be-
come an intentional tort nuisance if the activity is done with intent to cause a 
nuisance. Such an instance can arise if a neighboring landowner notifies the 
active party of the nuisance and the person creating the nuisance refuses to 
stop. Thus, the action becomes intentionally negligent and a claim for inten-
tional tort arises. The intent must also be unreasonable (i.e., (a) the gravity of 
the harm outweighs the utility of the conduct or (b) the harm caused is serious 
and the cost to compensate for it makes the conduct impractical). Thus, the 
common law does provide potential avenues for holding polluting industries 
liable. However, an industry that is permitted, has greater protections than 
those without. 
v. Potential Solutions 
Hydraulic fracturing operations pose significant challenges to individual 
plaintiffs seeking a remedy against non-adjacent hydraulic fracturing mines 
and disposal wells. Furthermore, proof of the source cause of a particular 
injury is required to establish a common law tort claim. Statutes that prohibit 
disclosure of the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing as ‘trade secrets’ fur-
ther prohibit property owners from being diligent stewards through proactive 
testing for chemicals in their own water supply. Due to North Carolina’s ge-
ology, tracing contaminating sources for causation purposes is impractica-
ble.102 The costs of litigation, and the difficulty in establishing causation are 
deterrents to individuals bringing common law tort claims. 
C. Defacto Liability and Remedy In Tort Claims 
Relying on private Tort claims to resolve conflicts with permitted indus-
tries in North Carolina creates an undue burden on the citizenry to find rem-
edy when the regulation of the industry was insufficient to address 
 
 101. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 395. 
 102. Henry Trapp, Jr. & Marilee A. Horn, Ground Water Atlas of the United States, Segment 11, U.S. 
Gᴇᴏʟᴏɢɪᴄᴀʟ . Sᴜʀᴠ.L17 (1997). 
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foreseeable conflicts. Tort law seeks to require a party to internalize the costs 
associated with the externalities it creates for another party. Tort law is fair 
because it forces the responsible party to bear the cost of injury to another. 
However, tort law is a system of interconnected legal doctrines. Unfortu-
nately, as applied to industry, it accomplishes its goal in an imperfect manner, 
requiring fact-specific determinations. Additionally, the transaction costs as-
sociated with the legal system are prohibitively high for some individuals. 
Accordingly, the present scheme does a poor job of handling small but mer-
itorious tort claims. 
The tort doctrines are not designed to remedy injuries that develop without 
notice over a long period of time, such as low-level chemical exposure.103 
Proving the required element of causation can defeat a claim due to the lag 
times involved and the difficulty in isolating the source of injury104 For ex-
ample, North Carolina’s Neuse River contains an excess of Nitrogen.105 
However, most of the sources of nitrogen are small and diffuse.106 Therefore, 
it is impossible to prove that any particular source caused any specific harm. 
Nonetheless, taking all the sources together, the cumulative effect is enor-
mous. Thus, society has been forced to supplement the tort system with a 
system of regulation. A second reason for regulation is that tort liability is 
only available once actual injury occurs. Jurisprudent efficiency would dic-
tate that reliance on a regulatory system, instead of tort doctrines for remedy, 
achieves desirable prevention when dealing with issues of public trust and 
pollution.107 
Unless North Carolina enacts strict liability statutes specific to hydraulic 
fracturing operations, the potential litigation associated with harms caused 
by its operations could be complex, numerous and span many years. Estab-
lishing strict liability for hydraulic fracturing accidents could preemptively 
address the potential judicial inefficiencies. 
 
 103. “Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose both are mechanisms used to limit the temporal 
extent or duration of liability for tortious acts.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (2014). 
 104. “[I]n toxic tort litigations, unlike traditional tort cases, causality is profoundly elusive both be-
cause biology does not afford clear and distinct explanations of the causal mechanisms by which toxic 
exposures produce birth defects, cancers, and other diseases, and because such medical problems are not 
usually traceable back to any one particular source.” Alani Golanski, General Causation at A Crossroads 
in Toxic Tort Cases, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 479, 481 (2003). 
 105. See Effects of Excess Nitrogen in the Neuse River Basin, North Carolina, USA, U.S. EPA, 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?dirEntryId=96624&Lab=NERL (last updated June 
6, 2005); 
https://www.americanrivers.org/river/neuse-river/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2018). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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III. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS 
A. Regulatory Controls 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants the federal govern-
ment the right to preempt state and local laws, in certain circumstances.108 
However, states have the power to regulate intrastate industries based on their 
general policing powers.109 In some areas of the law, the federal government 
explicitly chose not to preempt state and local regulations. For example, the 
Clean Water Act leaves it to the states to govern water rights within their own 
borders.110 As a state that follows the Dillon’s Rule, North Carolina’s legis-
lative body has final authority on any intrastate regulations.111 In addition, 
state governments have historically regulated “mining, oil and gas drilling 
and other extractive industries that do not operate on federal lands or in con-
nection with offshore production.”112 However, if a federal agency is in-
volved in the permitting of operations that could impact water supplies, a 
state defers to the federal oversight.113 
1. Purpose 
Regulations serve a critical role in maintaining standards for the benefit of 
the industry and those impacted by industry. When an industry is not state 
regulated, a ‘race to the bottom’ can begin within the industry in which the 
most production is sought without consideration of the impact of the indus-
try’s waste. Business interests have significant advantages to organize and 
pressure political actors to achieve an industry’s narrowly focused goals. The 
goals of an industry often do not comport with public interest responsibil-
ity.114 A race to the bottom concern includes “states competing for mobile 
 
 108. “Supremacy clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere with act of Congress.” Rose 
v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 107 S. Ct. 334, 93 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1986); U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 109. Shaun A. Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing: Trends in State Preemption, 64 Pʟᴀɴ. 
& Eɴᴠᴛʟ. Lᴀᴡ 7, 3 (2012). 
 110. 33 U.S.C. 1251 (2002). 
 111. Supra note at 11. 
 112. Richardson et al., supra note 28 at 5. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed a rule 
in May 2012 that would require disclosure of fracturing fluid constituents in connection with fracking 
operations on BLM lands. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal 
and Indian Lands, 77 Fed Reg. 27,691, 27,710 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 
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handling and disposal of produced and backwater flow from fracking operations on BLM lands). 
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technical area particularly within the expertise of the EPA, the agency’s interpretation of its regulations 
should be given great weight by the Court”), see generally Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power 
& Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, (1972). 
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capital investment by lowering their regulatory standards.”115 An industry’s 
dangling of economic improvements to a state can reasonably be expected to 
influence the lack of impediments a state creates for that industry. 
In order to avoid the risks associated with economic-motivated influences 
that can result in a race to the bottom scenario, it is necessary for states to 
establish strong bodies of policy. These policy decisions should focus on 
conflicting interests that industries, such as fracking, have on all stakeholders 
in a state; including neighboring property owners and users of impacted re-
sources. The state’s rights at issue with hydraulic fracturing operations, from 
intrastate commerce, to policing powers, to quality of life concerns and prop-
erty rights issues, require North Carolina’s legislative body develop statutory 
standards that specify priority of the impacted rights in order to prevent 
piecemeal remedies that impose on the rights and undermine the state’s 
broader policy goals. 
2. Zoning 
North Carolina is free from the challenges legislatures in Home Rule states 
have in controlling permitting and prevention of fracking in their states.116 In 
Home Rule jurisdictions, local municipalities have more independence from 
state legislatures than in Dillon’s Rule jurisdictions.117 However, in a Dillon’s 
Rule state, when the “republican moments” of a legislature favor less envi-
ronmental regulatory protections, the state’s judiciary can intervene, in sup-
port of local ordinances confined to “matters of zoning and community char-
acter have a strong likelihood of success”.118 The judiciary can support local 
municipality’s zoning ordinances as a way to restrict hydraulic fracturing op-
erations when the state legislature has not provided such protections. 
North Carolina courts consistently hold that “agencies, not being elected, 
just can’t possibly be legitimately as powerful a legal force as the 
 
mass interests, many of whose potential members either do not find it worth their while to contribute to 
the formation of groups or are content to free ride on the efforts of others). Another public-choice idea, 
capture theory, articulates ways in which business interests can capture the regulatory process (and regu-
latory agencies) for their own benefit to erect barriers to entry, capture rents, and otherwise pursue their 
own interests.”). 
 115. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1235 (1992) (arguing that a 
state’s decision to prioritize economic development over environmental protection should be respected). 
 116. Mumby, William C., Trust in Local Government: How States’ Legal Obligations to Protect Wa-
ter Resources Can Support Local Efforts to Restrict Fracking, 44 Ecology L. Q. 195 (2017). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Spence, supra note 38 at 468 (“A republican moment is a function of the amount of public at-
tention devoted to a particular policy decision.”). 
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legislature.”119The rules promulgated by a commission or agency are not held 
to the same precedential standard as a legislative statute would be.120 How-
ever, the N.C. General Assembly granted zoning power to county commis-
sioners.121 Local counties in the State can use their zoning powers to prevent 
any conduct that “poses a significant threat to [a county’s] residents’ health, 
safety, and general welfare.”122 North Carolina’s judiciary can enforce the 
zoning laws as an act of the State’s General Assembly over the regulations 
promulgated by a commission or agency, thus providing a grant of powers 
that a county could rely on in defense of their prohibition of hydraulic frac-
turing. 
B. Statutes: Water 
Access to groundwater in North Carolina has been a right valued by its 
citizens for generations. The N.C. General Assembly expressly declared that 
it is the “public policy of this State to provide for the conservation of its water 
and air resources.”123 The State’s General Assembly previously sought to es-
tablish the importance of water standards for the purpose of protecting human 
health. However, in 2015 the N.C. General Assembly added language that 
reframed the prior importance of clean groundwater from a right of the 
State’s citizens, to it being an important element for the legislature’s end-
goal of industrial development: 
Standards of water and air purity shall be designed to protect human health, 
to prevent injury to plant and animal life, to prevent damage to public and 
private property, to insure the continued enjoyment of the natural attractions 
of the State, to encourage the expansion of employment opportunities, to 
provide a permanent foundation for healthy industrial development and to 
secure for the people of North Carolina, now and in the future, the beneficial 
uses of these great natural resources.124 
The equilibrium amongst stakeholders changes when the interests of an in-
dustry are added to a protective statute. This change equalized industry rights 
 
 119. See Richard Whisnant, Rulemaking Authority in N.C. — Are Rules Legally as Powerful as Stat-
utes?, U.N.C. Sch. of Gov’t; Envtl Law in Context (Dec. 14, 2015) (“an administrative agency has no 
power to promulgate rules and regulations which alter or add to the law it was set up to administer or 
which have the effect of substantive law”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See 18 N.C.Gen. Stat. §153A-320. 
 122. See Matter of Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1201 (N.Y. 2014); see also Robinson 
Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 484 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (holding partially that Pennsylvania 
statute requiring municipalities to permit oil and gas operations in all zoning districts violated substantive 
due process because “it allow[ed] incompatible uses in zoning districts and does not protect the interests 
of neighboring property owners from harm, alters the character of the neighborhood, and makes irrational 
classifications”). 
 123. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-211. (2015). 
 124. Id. (emphasis added). 
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with that of the Mining Act of 1971’s original intent to protect individual 
rights to clean groundwater. Thus, disturbing the previously established pri-
ority of the right to clean groundwater over industrial operations; marking a 
critical rebalance in which industrial rights became prioritized over clean 
groundwater rights. The 2015 legislative changes to priority of rights created 
more potential for conflict between the rights, because of the varying oppos-
ing interests. Further regulations are now necessary to maintain a balance 
between the interests which can foreseeably conflict due to hydraulic frac-
turing operations. 
Following the legislative adoption of priority of industrial interests, a bevy 
of related statutes were enacted in an attempt to reign in the complex rela-
tionships between the stakeholders. For example, in 2017 the N.C. General 
Assembly passed N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.1; a bill designed to provide bet-
ter preventative oversight by requiring permits for certain activities affecting 
water pollution. The statute provides, in relevant part: 
The Commission shall act on all permits so as to prevent, so far as reason-
ably possible, considering relevant standards under State and federal laws, 
any significant increase in pollution of the waters of the State from any new 
or enlarged sources.125 
This statute further provides for permitting of industrial wastewater dis-
charge facilities that a violator must thence pay damages to the State, not to 
the impacted real property owner. The present statutes that impact water have 
lessened the individual’s rights to groundwater, prioritized water for indus-
trial development, and made polluters of groundwater supplies liable to the 
state; leaving individual property owners with only individual tort claims to 
remedy any damages they personally suffer. 
C. Statutes: Hydraulic Fracturing 
As mentioned above, North Carolina’s mining rights have undergone a 
dramatic change in priority amongst interests in it’s more recent legislation, 
since the State’s first significant mining rights act. The State’s Mining Rights 
Act of 1971 established specific procedural and permitting regulations for 
mining operations in the State.126 N.C. Gen. Stat. §74-50(b1)(2) requires an 
applicant to notify any landowner of adjoining land “that lies within 1,000 
feet of the permit boundaries” of the mining operation permit application. 
 
 125. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.1 (2017). 
 126. The Mining Act of 1971, ch. 74, Art. 7, (1971). 
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These permitting requirements resolve any mineboring issues with prescrip-
tive easements.127 
The language of the Act does not require notice to all potential stakehold-
ers, it requires only that notice be given to surface landowner’s who are 
within 1,000 feet of a well. The issuance of the permit will determine who 
gains notice based on their surface presence within 1,000 feet of the mining 
shaft. However, the Act does not require notice to individuals impacted by 
horizontal shafts that are designed to reach long distances. Such lack of no-
tice beyond 1,000 feet is a risk, as the potential distance of the shaft on the 
surface coupled with the potential of undisclosed chemicals spreading 
through geological substrata presents the need for notice to a larger distance 
of impacted stakeholders. 
1. The Mining Act of 1971 
The Mining Act of 1971(“The Act”) provides standards for mining opera-
tions occurring within North Carolina.128 The Act seeks to protect the mining 
industry in the state, while reasonably preserving the general welfare, health, 
safety, beauty, and property rights of North Carolina’s citizens.129 The Act 
provides conditions for the proper operation of mines and the reclamation of 
mining lands and waste.130 The Act was amended in 2017, extending mining 
permits from a ten-year permit to a life-of-the-site permit.131 Considering the 
aforementioned permit notification issues, this amendment furthers the con-
cern that impacted citizens will not have proper notice of the chemicals po-
tentially found in their drinking water, until injury occurs. 
2. Energy Modernization Act 
In 2014, the N.C. General Assembly passed the Energy Modernization 
Act, a series of statutes that establish hydraulic fracturing as a legal mining 
operation in the state.132 The Energy Modernization Act and the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act of 2014, together provide legal grounds for the exploration 
of potential natural gas and oil extraction in North Carolina.133 The Energy 
Modernization Act established a commission to oversee the permit 
 
 127. “In order to acquire an easement by prescription, the use must be adverse, hostile, or under a 
claim of right; open and notorious; continuous and uninterrupted for a period of 20 years; and there must 
be a substantial identity of the easement claimed.” 11 N.C. Index 4th Easements § 36 
 128. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74-46-69. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 74-50 (2017). 
 132. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-293.1; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-290. 
 133. Id. 
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process.134 The Oil and Gas Conservation Act created a commission to enact 
rules that seek to achieve the non-wasteful harvest of the oil reserves and 
protects the confidentiality of the content of the hydraulic fracturing fluid 
which the fracking company deems a proprietary “trade secret”.135 
The Energy Modernization Act relies on local health departments to field 
review of fluids used in the oil extraction processes. Yet, the Energy Mod-
ernization Act also criminalizes disclosure of the proprietary chemical con-
tent by any medical provider or fire chief.136 The Energy Modernization Act 
further burdens the responding safety personnel with administrative liability 
to the civilian owner of the proprietary information requiring the medical 
provider or fire chief, upon demand by the owner of the proprietary infor-
mation to both provide a written statement of need and a confidentiality 
agreement from the Fire Chief prior to public disclosure.137 The Energy Mod-
ernization Act makes the disclosure of the confidential information a class 1 
misdemeanor.138 
The Energy Modernization Act also provides for commission review and 
override of any zoning ordinance that may, from the commission’s perspec-
tive, unnecessarily bar hydraulic fracturing.139 Finally, the Energy Moderni-
zation Act requires that mineral rights owners engaging in activities that im-
pact the surface landowner need only provide thirty days notice of planned 
entry prior to beginning its permitted activity.140 Summarily the Energy Mod-
ernization Act restricts the N.C. General Assembly’s zoning act141, safety re-
sponders in their ability to warn the public of danger, burdens safety respond-
ers with a duty to gain permission from private enterprise prior to disclosure 
of chemicals that could be dangerous to the public, and criminally and civilly 
penalizes safety responders if they disclose the potential contents of the dan-
ger without pre-approval. 
North Carolina recognizes rebuttable presumptive liability for water con-
tamination.142 The presumption is rebuttable for a number of reasons, includ-
ing two predictable situations: (1) where the surface owner refuses to allow 
the mining company to test the water supply prior to drilling; and (2) where 
the water supply is over one-half mile from a well-head.143 This creates the 
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potential for individual real property owners to lose their rights to claim dam-
ages should the property owner fail to cooperate with a private industry ac-
cess to their property. 
The N.C. General Assembly has taken significant steps with its trifecta of 
legislative acts and amendments to provide the fracking industry opportuni-
ties to engage in operations within the state. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-378 is the 
only requirement that places any pre-emptive liability on mining opera-
tions.144 Cumulatively, present mining and fracking legislation places a fair 
amount of responsibility on local government agencies, such as fire and 
health departments, to manage potential liabilities that are created by private 
industry mining and fracking operations. Relying on local agencies without 
providing statutory provisions for training or standardized administration of 
hydraulic fracturing operation oversight statewide could result in needless 
liability and criminal charges. 
3. State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 
The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (“SEPA”) was passed the 
same year as the Mining Rights Act145. In 1971, the N.C. General Assembly 
established the importance of the ability to harvest and utilize the natural re-
sources available in the state. However, in that same 1971 legislative session, 
the N.C. General Assembly passed SEPA that articulated protections forthe 
environment from misuse and abuse.146 SEPA expressly provides that man’s 
role, as trustee for future generations of the earth, requires conservation and 
protection of natural resources.147 SEPA also requires that people “maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”148 
SEPA emphasizes maintaining safe and aesthetically pleasing environments 
in the state and prioritizes the “beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety.”149 SEPA, in tandem with the Mining 
Act of 1971, prioritizes health and safety above harvesting natural resources 
found in the State.150 
The legislation of 1971 marked a profound commitment to health over in-
dustry. If still applicable, the commitment to health over industry should be 
cemented in clear regulatory measures that protect citizens from risks due to 
poor administrative foresight. Without measures that take the risk out of 
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 145. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113A-1 (2019). 
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impacts to health by speculative industries, property owners are left to fend 
for themselves in expensive, and judicially burdensome, actions in state 
courts.151 Such a foreseeable outcome of a state policy scheme that has open 
doors to an industry, with the potential to cause large numbers of claims, 
requires oversight in ways the judiciary should not be tasked to resolve. 
The N.C. General Assembly’s recent statutes equalize hydraulic fracturing 
rights with other property rights, resulting in the private owner’s rights being 
of less import than the right to frack. North Carolina tort law offers benefits 
for both hydraulic fracturing business and private owners injured by hydrau-
lic fracturing chemicals. However, rights of the industry are, by default, 
raised in priority against individual rights stakeholders due to the deterring 
effect the cost of litigating individual fact-reliant claims has. This lack of 
successfully litigated individual claims, results in unsettled doctrine that the 
judiciary and public cannot rely upon. Without a settled legislative solution, 
the courts may be forced to make decisions that can result in piecemeal ju-
risprudence of these conflicts. The right to engage in commercial activity 
must be weighed against the cost of the risk and the loss of the property 
owner’s right to groundwater. The state’s legislature cannot leave such de-
termination to piecemeal jurisprudence. 
D. Constitutional Protections 
The primary legal claim made by oil and gas industry representatives, 
when presented with governmental regulations that seek to protect non-in-
dustry property owners by restricting mining operations, is a violation under 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.152 The 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, provides that “private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”153 The 
Clause’s underlying premise is that the government should not be “forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”154 
A state is permitted to engage in takings when it exercises its police power, 
acting to protect the “public health, safety, morals and general welfare.”155 In 
Beroth Oil Co. v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Transp., the Court of Appeals in North 
Carolina held that wholesale deprivation of all rights is not required to sustain 
a takings action. However, the owner must establish “an interference 
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substantial enough to reduce the market value of his property.”156 Thus, a 
state can interfere with economic use of real property by an owner, without 
engaging in a taking. 
The oil and gas industry has attempted to defeat regulatory measures that 
restrict extraction of oil and gas through fracking.157 Industry representatives 
argue that fracking is an absolute right they are entitled to.158 The industry 
claim is that any regulation or prohibition of the industry is a regulatory tak-
ing of private property, a matter the government must pay for.159 Companies 
threaten local governments and complain that regulations would “bring dire 
consequences following any government regulation that reduces the eco-
nomic value of oil and gas interests.”160 These threats by the industry to file 
what would involve long litigious battles of potentially bankruptable rewards 
have been successful in discouraging some communities from enacting reg-
ulations.161 When government bodies are intimidated, it destroys the very no-
tions of fairness and justice that are at the core of takings jurisprudence. It 
forces the government to let harm occur as a default in order to avoid the 
preemptive economic risk of litigation, a consequence most municipalities 
do not wish to bear.162 
However, the Takings Clause is not as favorable to the hydraulic fracturing 
industry as the companies assert. The clause is a provision that protects prop-
erty owners from the complete loss of their ownership rights. Takings juris-
prudence “does not extend a right to compensation for a reduction in value 
of the property due to the governments regulations.”163 In fact, facial takings 
claims rarely succeed. Specifically, the plaintiff’s takings claim must pass 
the Agins Test.164 The Agins Test consists of two inquiries; the first question 
is “does the regulation substantially advance a legitimate governmental in-
terest?”; and second, “does the regulation deprive the owner of economically 
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viable use of her property?”165 The economic deprivation is not measured by 
the property owner’s choice of industrial use.166 The jurisprudence of the 
Takings Clause encourages the government to balance the private and public 
interests as a whole. The Takings Clause leaves the government with the re-
sponsibility of making the decision to balance the interests involved.167 The 
balance considers the private owner’s interests, an industry’s access to alter-
native operations, and the “great risks to the health, safety, and environment 
of neighboring communities” by allowing the interest to be asserted.168 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
A. Impact on Insurance Industry 
The risk of upending settled liability doctrine can have a deleterious effect 
on secondary industries that operate in the state, such as providers of insur-
ance. Insurance companies can lose interest in conducting business in a state 
where potential risks are unpredictable due to unsettled legal doctrine.169 A 
property owner’s homeowner’s insurance provider is responsible for cover-
ing the costs associated with injuries suffered by guests on the premises. A 
property owner’s inability to test their groundwater for chemicals, deemed 
proprietary and used in a state-approved industry170, could burden the prop-
erty owner and their insurance company with a liability as due diligence is 
not available. If visitors became ill, the homeowner’s insurance company 
would be responsible for remedy of the injury.171 If notice or diagnosis of 
illness is delayed, liability protections are further complicated by the state’s 
statute of repose.172 Liability protections will also be frustrated if there is a 
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delay in identifying which hydraulic fracturing mine or disposal well was the 
direct cause of the harm.173 
North Carolina’s failure to establish strict liability regulations or provi-
sions that allow for notice to real property owners, has created a vast pool of 
high-risk insurance product consumers. An unstable pool of risk is unattrac-
tive to insurance companies because their economic success relies on low 
volumes of high-risk clients in order to be profitable. For these reasons, the 
market of insurance providers have begun refusing to insure homes in areas 
where the hydraulic fracturing industry is active.174 
B. Business Law - Triangular Mergers 
In business, assets are desirable, liabilities are not. A fiduciary duty is 
owed to the corporation and its shareholders by the corporation’s board of 
directors; it imposes that decisions must be made in the best interest of those 
entities that own and are the corporation.175 Therefore, a governing board is 
legally required to reduce the liabilities of a corporation, by any means le-
gally possible, if the reduction in liabilities will be in the best interest of the 
corporation. In remedying a liability, an economic commodity takes priority 
over an entity’s debt, including liabilities. A mining operator can bypass large 
losses in payouts for injuries it caused by becoming judgment-proof via a 
triangular merger of the polluting business with another entity.176 Most 
fracking entities are corporations that could become judgment-proof by 
merging with other business entities.177 It is not unreasonable for corpora-
tions to engage in a triangular merger conditioned on the voluntary denial of 
liabilities in the merger contract.178 
North Carolina does not require a corporation to buy a prior company’s 
liabilities in a merger. A company’s acquisition of a target company’s assets, 
but not the debts, creates an issue when lifelong lease of mineral rights exist. 
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Failure to require liability acquisition could result in targeted and acquiring 
corporations benefiting from business law doctrines to avoid the costs of lia-
bility.179 The use of business law doctrines by companies to avoid bearing 
liability for damages also creates the inevitability that the taxpayers and gov-
ernment (federal and/or state) will be left to remedy the damage created by 
an industry. The hydraulic fracturing industry benefits from the present con-
ditions in North Carolina that allow it tooperate under diminished govern-
mental oversight, with low risk of tort liability, and a potential to inflict per-
manent damage to water supplies of a naturally occurring resource that is 
necessary for life.180 
CONCLUSION 
This article sets forth an assessment of a wide array of legal doctrine and 
statutory law that influences stakeholders interests, risks and liabilities from 
active hydraulic fracturing operations in North Carolina. It provides a synop-
sis of law that reveals the potential for substantial legal conflict among a large 
number of stakeholders in North Carolina if hydraulic fracturing operations 
commence. 
Together, the varied stakeholders have conflicts that common law alone 
cannot settle and present statutory remedies fail to resolve. Common law has 
in many ways withstood historical advancements and, in some instances, has 
itself evolved. Yet, the technological advancement of horizontal hydraulic 
fracturing presents unique challenges to settled common law doctrine in 
North Carolina. These conflicts indicate significant oversight of the industry 
is required; and the N.C. General Assembly must regulate with consideration 
to avoid conflicts with settled legal doctrine. This is especially true when 
horizontal hydraulic fracturing is at issue; it creates complex rightsholders 
conflict, where the competing right’s interests are sometimes subtly, yet sig-
nificantly, interwoven. 
Failure to address foreseeable harm is a dereliction of duty to prevent 
harm. Empowering an industry, or protecting a resource, such as water, is 
only as beneficial as it is productive. If pollution by an industry creates 
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 180. See federal agency response to Elk River Spill, https://infocus.nlm.nih.gov/2016/03/09/rapid-
response-west-virginia-elk-river-2014-spill/ (accessed Oct. 19, 2019); 
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/special_reports/judge-concerned-freedom-industries-won-t-clean-
up-elk-river/article_178fa67d-78d8-595a-bc9f-e06ede9f6f1f.html (accessed Oct. 19, 2019) (“while ef-
forts “will be undertaken to remediate the site,” there are “financial limitations” to what Freedom “can 
viably undertake by way of compliance with” the remediation plan for its Etowah Terminal”). 
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foreseeable injury, that alone is grounds to regulate it. If protecting a resource 
destroys community, that alone is grounds for opening access through regu-
lation. The present approach in the N.C. General Assembly must reflect its 
responsibility to assist the judicial branch in avoiding inefficient and ill-con-
sidered legislation that results in burdens to the court system, and injury to 
North Carolina’s citizenry. 
